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ANew Look at an Old Association:
Will Today's Women Be Tomorrow's Jaycees?
by Neal Devins

Roberts, et al.
v.
United States Jaycees
(Docket No. 83-724)

(and with whom they don't want) to keep company. The
preeminence of either right is the necessary disparagement of the other. Consequently, at its roots, the Jaycees
case raises the fundamental social policy question of
whether state-created group entitlements should prevail
over the individual and his or her personal preferences.
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ISSUES
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court
will tackle the knotty problems of whether freedom of
association is an independent constitutional protection
and, if so, whether the Jaycees can invoke freedom of
association as a justifiable basis for their nationwide
policy of excluding women from their rolls as full members.
The Jaycees case is attracting a lot of national attention for a number of reasons. First, it is unclear whether
there is a straightforward protection for the freedom of
the association. If one exists, its contours are unknown.
Second, the Jaycees is one of the nation's largest membership organizatons - with 271,000 individual male
members in 6,909 chapters. Third, the Supreme Court
decision might define the constitutional rights of membership organizations and this is of great significance to
many of these organizations. (Not surprisingly, grol!Ps
like the Rotary, Kiwanis and the Boy Scouts have all filed"
amicus briefs in support of the Jaycees.) Fourth, this
lawsuit once again calls into question the nature of the
states' interest in preventing sex discrimination. (Consequently, groups like the National Organization for Women and the American Civil Liberties Union have also
filed amicus briefs on the state's side of the case.)
Finally, and most importantly, the Jaycees case will
test the constitutionality (as it applies to the Jaycees) of a
Minnesota statute which prohibits sex discrimination in
"public accommodations."
This case is also of great interest because it pits two
discordant elements of our constitutional system against
each other. Sex discrimination laws seek to guarantee a
minimum standard of treatment to a large segment of
our population. In many ways, such laws reflect the
socialist vision of life treatment. Freedom of association,
on the other hand, is an individualistic liberation construct. It allows people to choose with ~hom they want
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FACTS
The Jaycees case is an appeal by the state of Minnesota from a 1983 decision by a divided panel of the
United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In
March, 1982, the United States District Court for Minnesota had ruled in favor of the state. Prior to that
ruling, in October, 1979, a state administrative law judge
found the Jaycees had violated Minnesota's Human
Rights Act prohibiting sex discrimination in public accommodations. This state decision was the basis of subsequent federal litigation.
The Jaycees, although organized in 1835 to enhance
the development of young men, permitted women to
become associate members. "Associate status" is akin to
being a poor cousin state. An associate cannot vote, hold
office, or be eligible for awards. Consequently, it is argued that women are denied the professional opportunities accorded to male members.
The origins of the Jaycees lawsuit was a dispute between the national organization and the Minneapolis
and St. Paul chapters of the organization. In 197 4 and
1975, women were allowed to become full members of
the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters. Such membership afforded women the right to vote, hold office
and be eligible for awards.
The national Jaycee organization subsequently informed the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapter that their
practice violated the organization's bylaws. After being
notified by the national organization that their chapters
were in danger, Minneapolis and St. Paul members alleged before the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights that the proposed charter allocations violated a
state law prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations.
A state administrative law judge held that the Jaycees
was a public accommodation under the state law. Consequently, because its sexually discriminatory membership
practices violated the statute, the Jaycees were enjoined
from revoking the charter of any Minnesota chapter
which admitted women members.
In appealing this decision in federal district court,
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the Jaycees offered three arguments: 1) Applying Minnesota's public accommodations law to the Jaycees interferes with their constitutional rights of asseciation; 2)
The state has failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest sufficient to outweigh the Jaycees'
right of association, and 3) The Minnesota statute is
unconstitutionally vague. The state disagreed with each
of these assertions. At the district court level, the state
prevailed on all three issues. (The state, in a decision
related to this lawsuit, also prevailed in the effort to have
the Minnesota Supreme Court rule that the United
States Jaycees is a place of public accommodation under
Minnesota law. Since state supreme court decisions are
final on matters of state law, the Jaycees could not appeal this ruling.)
At the outset of this opinion, the district court noted:
"It is questionable whether association not directed at
the exercise of other First Amendment rights enjoys
constitutional protection." The court did not resolve
that issue, however. Instead, it based its conclusion on
the related notions that: "Invidious private discrimination is not entitled to affirmative constitutional protection, and that the state's interest in preventing
discrimination in access to public accommodations is in
any event sufficiently compelling to override whatever
right of association exists." The district court also rejected the Jaycees' vagueness argument.
The appellate court, in a 2 to 1 decision, reversed.
Crucial to that ruling was its holding: "That the Jaycees,
a substantial part of whose activities involve the expression of social and political beliefs and the advocacy of
legislation and conditional change, does have a right of
association protected by the First Amendment." In
reaching this conclusion, the appellate court emphasized
the Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v. Alabama (357
U.S. 449 (1958)), which held: "It is immaterial whether
the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain
to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and
state action which may have the effect of curtailing the
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."
This ruling is significant given that the stated purpose of the J aycees-the professional advancement and
development of young men-is not a traditionally protected First Amendment activity. Additionally, some of
the Jaycees' positions on ··women's issues" might have
been affected by a change in membership practices. For
example, the Jaycees have spoken out against the Equal
Rights Amendment and a woman's right to abortion-ondemand. The state of Minnesota had contended that
First Amendment association protections should not be
triggered: "The Jaycees can point to no organization
goal to which women cannot and do not aspire, no
organization function which women cannot perform,
and no organization position regarding which sex mandates a point of view."
The appellate court also ruled that the state's interest
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in prohibiting sex discrimination in public accommodations is not sufficiently compelling to justify an abridgement of the associational freedom. The appellate court
did recognize, however, that the state's interest in clearing "the channels of commerce of the irrelevancy of sex
to make sure that goods and services and advancement
in the business world are available to all on an equal
basis" is a public purpose of the "first magnitude." Yet,
the appellate court felt that the state could accomplish
the objectives through "ways less directly and immediately intensive on the freedom of association than an
outright prohibition [such as denial of tax credits or tax
exemptions]." The state-stressing the state court's
binding ruling that the Jaycees were a public accommodation involved in the sale of memberships-had contended that it could not accomplish its end in a less
intensive manner. The appellate court also validated the
Jaycees argument that denial of full membership status
to women did not materially limit women in their efforts
to succeed in business and professional life. The state
criticized this conclusion, arguing that: "The supposition that there are other avenues of professional advancement is based upon the moribund theory of
'separate but equal."'
The appellate court also concluded that the Minnesota statute was unconstitutionally vague. The appellate
court viewed as mystifying the state court ruling that the
Kiwanis organization was private and the Jaycee's public. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that
persons of ordinary intelligence could not distinguish
between protected private and unprotected public organizations. The state claimed that the Minnesota Supreme Court ruling was based in a principled-and
discernable-application of the statute.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Jaycees case speaks directly to the pressing question of whether or how the state can protect a woman's
right to participate in America's "free market economy."
Clearly, the state can prevent overt forms of discrimination. Yet, state action which interfered with an association's internal practices raises fundamental questions
about the degree of permissible state interference in
private decisionmaking. Although the Jaycees permit all
males between the ages of 18 to 35 to become members,
it is possible that that group of individuals have an
agenda distinct both from women and from men in
other age groups. Also, if the state prevails on this issue,
it is an open question as to how the state can involve
itself in the membership practices of other more discrete
organizations.
On the other hand, sex discrimination is a proper
concern of the state. The state thus should be permitted
to remove artificial business which limits a woman's right
to freely participate in public or quasi-public activities.
This right is especially significant when it is associated
PREVIEW

with professional self-advancement (as it is in this case).
The key task for the Court (and it is a hefty one) is to
distinguish between private association and public discrimination. Such line drawing is not easy both because
each side can make a convincing case and because the
constitutional stakes are fairly high. On one hand, a
decision in favor of the Jaycees will make it quite easy to
assert the associational privilege. The plus side of such a
result is increased cultural pluralism and greater selfdetermination. Yet, a decision in favor of the Jaycees
also has the concomitant risk of allowing quasi-public
organizations to indiscriminately shut their doors on
certain classes of individuals. This occurrence might
lead to greater social stratification.
A decision in favor of the state, on the other hand,
would provide women (and possibly other groups) with
a greater right to shape their own future and to shape
society. Although this is a good result, such a state-guaranteed right may prove too costly. State-prescribed limitations on the associational freedom of individuals is at
odds with our liberalistic tradition.
It is difficult to assess whether the Supreme Court
can formulate a constitutional doctrine sensitive to the
needs of both individual perogative and group advancement. If it can, we will all gain through the Jaycees decision. If it cannot, either the goal of social justice or selfdeterminism will gain at the expense of the other.
ARGUMENTS
For the United States Jaycees
1. The application of Minnesota's Public Accommoda-
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tion law to the Jaycees interferes with the Jaycees
constitutional right of association.
2. The state has failed to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest sufficient to outweigh the Jaycees right of association.
3. The Minnesota statute is unconstitutional on grounds
of vagueness and overbreadth.
For the State of Minnesota
1. Application of the Minnesota statute does not burden
the Jaycees' First Amendment rights.
2. The state interest in prohibiting sex discrimination is
compelling and there are no less restrictive means
available to the state to advance that compelling interest.
3. The Minnesota statute is not unconstitutionally
vague.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Minnesota
The states of New York and California, Northwestern Bell, Alliance for Women Membership, National Organization for Women, American Jewish
Committee, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, American
Civil Liberties Union, National League of Cities, United
States Conference of Mayors, and others.

In Support of the Jaycees
Conference of Private Organizations, Boy Scouts of
America, Rotary International.
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